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Abstract
This thesis studies the process of formation of Arab nationalist ideas in the period from the second
half of the 19th century to 1914. According to the theoretical works on nationalism of Miroslav
Hroch and Ernest Gellner it  examines the causes and influences,  as well as the most important
milestones of the development of the Arab nation building process. The work traces the origins of
Arab  nationalism  in  the  evolution  of  predecessor  ideologies  such  as  Islamic  modernism,
Ottomanism and Arabism, and studies their mutual relations. In addition to that, it conducts the
study of the social aspects of early adherents of Arabism and Arab nationalism. The research is
based on primary sources of the participant on the Arab national movement as well as on secondary
historical works.
Abstrakt
Práce sleduje proces formace arabských nacionalistických myšlenek v období od druhé poloviny
19. století  do roku 1914. Na základě teoretických prací o nacionalismu od Miroslava Hrocha a
Ernesta  Gellnera  zkoumá  příčiny  a  vlivy  a  rovněž  také  nejdůležitější  milníky  vývoje  procesu
formování arabského národa. Práce dokumentuje počátky arabského nacionalismu jako nástupce
jemu předcházejících ideologií, jako je například islámský modernismus, osmanismus a arabismus a
studuje  jejich  vzájemné  vztahy.  K  tomu  je  také  přidružena  studie  sociálních  aspektů  raných
přívrženců  arabismu  a  arabského  nacionalismu.  Výzkum  je  založen  na  dobových  pramenech
zpracovaných účastníky arabského národního hnutí a rovněž také na odborné literatuře. 
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Nationalism has been one of the most influencing ideologies that shaped the modern history
of humanity and its impact is related not only to our past, but to our present as well. In the age of
continuing  globalization  it  might  seem that  nationalism is  losing  its  importance  as  ethnic  and
national differences gradually dissolve.  In reality,  nationalism continues to be a major factor of
global developments today. 
In the academic community, there has been an increased interest in nationalism since the
1990s. This is a result of erupting national conflicts and civil wars that followed the collapse of
communism and the dissolution of multinational empires such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
When  this  kind  of  dissolution  occurs,  oftentimes  nationalist  ideologies  emerge.1 The  Ottoman
Empire was not exception and during its last years and after its fall, various nationalist ideologies
from Turkish and Arabic to Greek and Serbian, emerged. 
No ideology has shaped Arab history of the 20th century more than the ideology of Arab
nationalism, which gained momentum after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and then lost some of
that momentum after the Arabs lost the war against Israel in 1967. While much research has been
invested in Arab nationalism of the 20th century, fewer scholars have investigated the social and
political circumstances that led to the emergence of this ideology.2 The purpose of this work is to
analyze the ideological foundations and the social backgrounds that accompanied the development
of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire before World War I.
The aim of this work is to answer the following five questions, which are linked to the
emergence of Arab nationalism: 1) Where did the ideology of Arab nationalism come from and to
what extent it is an import of Western ideas, or is it the result of the evolution of Arabic thought and
Arab intellectuals? 2) To what extent did Arab nationalist ideas spread by 1914, and what was the
influence of Turkish policy on the development of the Arab national movement? 3) According to the
theoretical  works  on  nationalism,  which  are  listed  in  chapter  one,  what  were  the  objective
components of the Arab national consciousness? 4) How do we examine the subjective features of
the Arab nation building process? Is Ernest Gellner’s theory of nationalism as an accompaniment of
modernity applicable to Arab nationalism? 5) According to Miroslav Hroch’s periodization, how
1 Miroslav Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody: Příčiny a předpoklady utváření moderních Evropských národů, (Praha:
Slon, 2009), 55.
2 Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983) ix.
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can we determine which stages the Arab nation building process went through during the studied
period (from the movement’s beginning to WWI)? 
In order to answer these questions it was imperative to first become familiar with the major
theories  on  nationalism  and  the  methodological  approaches  towards  this  term.  Here  I  choose
Gellner, one of the most prominent academics of the modernist approach, and his definition as the
analytical tool to evaluate Arab nationalism and examine its development until 1914. According to
him “It is a political principle in which cultural similarity is the major social bound and therefore it
is an effort to statehood and an effort for political reality to correspond with cultural reality”3
Secondly,  it  was  necessary to  research the history of  the  Ottoman Empire  and its  Arab
provinces from primary and secondary historical sources, and to study scholarly works dealing with
Arab  nationalism.  Applying  the  methodology  of  the  theoretical  approaches  to  nationalism  I
identified the critical turning points in the development of the Arab nation building process and the
nationalizing tendencies of the Arab world. 
Chapter one deals with defining the terminology that is used in the subsequent parts of the
work and the terms that play a key role in the nation building process. Here, the various approaches
towards  nation  and  nationalism are  introduced,  from the  primordial  to  the  modernist  theories.
Chapter two explores how factors such as the European expansion and the Ottoman reformation
influenced the social structure in the Arab lands. This chapter also studies the intellectual reactions
to the switch of power balance between the East and the West and traces the seeds of nationalist
ideas among them. In chapter three, the ideological and power struggle between Ottomanism and
Arabism  (the  predecessor  of  political  Arab  nationalism)  in  the  crucial  second  constitutional
Ottoman period 1908-1918 is discussed. In this part, I analyze the social factors of Arabism and
apply Gellner’s theory. 
Before proceeding to the work itself, it is necessary to mention the previous research that has
been done on this subject, and which constitutes the core of this work’s sources. The study of Arab
nationalism began with the works of early participants of its movement, such as Satiʿ al-Husri,
Amin Saʿid and George Antonius. These men were participants and witnesses of the Arab national
movement, therefore their work is considered to by primary sources. Almost every study on this
subject that emerged from that time, includes a reference to Antonius’s  The Arab Awakening  that
shaped the study of Arab nationalism and its history for at least twenty years since it was published




Antonius saw the beginnings of Arab nationalism in the 19 th century literary movement and
within intellectual societies, where mainly Christian Arabs, who were exposed to the teachings of
Western  missionary  schools,  revived  the  Arab  nationality  long  suppressed  by  the  Turks.  The
Christian Arabs then led their Muslim brothers to base the political unit on nationality, instead of
religion.5 This process culminated in the Arab Revolt of 1916 and incidents after it. 
In the 1950s and 1960s a new generation of scholars called Antonius’s notions into question.
Since  then,  it  has  generally  been accepted  that  Antonius  overemphasized  the  link  between the
literary  Nahda  and  the  early  emergence  of  nationalist  feelings  in  the  period  of  1908-1918.6
Additionally,  the influence of the missionary schools as the bearers of modern secular learning
among the Christian Arabs was rebutted. Those who opposed this view, stated that these schools
were mainly oriented on religious and sectarian education.7 Among the writers of this generation
were Sylvia G. Haim, Zeine N. Zeine, Hisham Sharabi, Bassam Tibi, and Albert Hourani. 
Albert Hourani partially maintains Antonius’s argument of missionary schools and claims,
that the Christian Arabs, unlike their Muslim counterparts did not have the problem of accepting
Western ideas without feeling a sense of betrayal to their cultural Islamic heritage. 8 On the other
hand, Hourani also claims that this movement was of limited influence on the development of the
nationalist ideas.9
Among the first scholars to question Antonius’s secular liberal origin of Arab nationalism
and to attribute the patronage of this nationalism to the role of Islamic modernism was Zeine, who
stressed that reviving Islam helped to develop Arab consciousness.10 Similarly, but with a slight
difference, Haim sees in Arab nationalism “the outcome of the severe intellectual crisis that Islam
experienced during the 19th century”11. This quote suggests an interpretation, that it was the failure
of Islamic modernist thinking to respond to the decline of the East and the modernity of the West,
which allowed the ideology of nationalism to overtake its place. 
4 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938); Satiʿ al-Husri, Al-Bilad al-ʿarabiya wa 
al-dawla al-ʿutmaniya [The Arab Countries and the Ottoman State], (Beirut: 1960); Amin Saʿid, Al-Thawra al-
ʿarabiya al-kubra [The Great Arab Revolt], Vol. 1 (Cairo: ʿIsa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934).
5 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 55-60.
6 Rashid Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A Reassessment," in Arab Nationalism, ed. 
Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 51.
7 Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 4.
8 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 95.
9 Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 204.
10 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918 
(Berkeley: Unversity of California Press, 1997), 11.
11 Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 6.
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All of these scholars generally agree that the second constitutional period of the Ottoman
Empire that started with the coup of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908, was
crucial for the growth of the Arab national movement. The policy of Turkish nationalism adopted by
the CUP after gaining power made the Arabs lose their illusions about achieving equality with the
Turks and effectively drew them even closer to Arab nationalism.12
The biggest challenger to this concept is Ernest Dawn, who argues that the inclination of the
CUP towards Turkish nationalism was overemphasized and that their policy remained generally
Ottomanist until the end of the war. Therefore, he denies that Arab nationalism is a response to the
CUP’s Turkification policy and argues, that Arabism stayed a minority movement until 1918. In the
struggle between Arabism and Ottomanism, he sees an inner elite struggle of rival Arab notables for
power.13
While  most  authors  accept  Dawn’s  arguments  that  Arabism continued to  be  a  minority
movement until 1918, his thesis that the CUP did not adopt the ideology of Turkish nationalism
before 1918, does not garner quite as much support. Hasan Kayalı, who studied the Arab-Turkish
relations  of  the  1908-1918  supports  his  arguments14,  but  Hanioğlu,  who  examined  secret
correspondences of the inner leading circle of the CUP party, proves that the movement has been
more intensely Turkish nationalist from an earlier stage, than most scholars expected.15
Dawn’s revisionist theory has been revised and made less contradicting to the traditionalist
theories by scholars of a third generation, such as Khalidi and Philip Khoury16. Dawn’s theory that
most of the Arabs before 1918 were Ottomanist, which he used to base his study of the notables of
Damascus, was questioned by Khalidi, who argues that in the coastal regions of the Levant, which
were ignored by most of the scholars and where was a more busy trading activity, a new middle
class  was  emerging.  This  class  adopted  the  rival  ideology of  Arabism simply to  challenge the
traditional leading class, the majority of whom stayed loyal to the Ottoman Empire.17
12 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 109; 
Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years 1875-1914 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1970), 88-89, 115.
13 Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 122-179.
14 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, 12. 
15 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
16 Khalidi,  “Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914,” 50-69; Philip Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab 
Nationalism, 58-74. 
17 Khalidi,  “Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914,” 55.
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1. Definitions and Terminology
1.1. Definition of the Term Nation
The efforts  to find a unified,  objective and universal  definition for the term nation,  had
always faced difficulties and there is no general consensus on this matter so far. The main reason for
it is, that the term comes from the Latin word natio and had acquired various meanings in different
languages and throughout the ages. 18
The nation became a subject of scholarly interest already in the 19 th and early 20th century,
which  is  the  period  when  modern  nations  as  we  know  them  today  were  just  being  formed.
Therefore, there is a visible impact of the regional and geographical background of the scholars on
this  matter.  For  example  in  Western  Europe,  where  states  have  existed  in  the  middle  ages,
approximately overlapping the territories of later nation states such as France and England, the
scholars considered the existence of a nation community as a natural and obvious matter. The term
nation was so, usually connected to the state and statehood. In Central Europe, however, where a
process of struggle for national unity had to proceed the emergence of nation states, the scholars
had to find a unified characteristics and features to define a community (nation) and differentiate it
from the others. Hence, nation was here connected with terms as language, culture and territory.19   
What these theories had in common, was their primordial character. Simply, because these
intellectuals who studied a nation were also a part of it, or very often part of a national struggle,
they identified themselves with this primordial concept. This was common in that period and was a
main point of nationalist theories. It is a belief, that the nation is a universal and always present
category in human history. As Ernest Gellner, whose theory is that nor nationalism, neither nations
are universal, would say that “these early scholars studying the nation were deeply addresses by
nationalism”20 and could not distinguish nationalist ideas as theories and not universal concepts (as
proclaimed by nationalists).  Based on this  concept  there was an effort  to  define the nation  by
objective and universal features that could be applicable to all the nations in the world.
However,  since  the  beginning  of  the  20th century  scholars  resigned  on  this  approach
postulating,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  find  such  features  due  to  the  variety of  nations  and  the
characteristics which are dominant for each one of them.21
18 Miroslav Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 16.
19 Ibid, 17.
20 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), 5.
21 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 18.
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 The theories emerging since, could be divided in two major streams. The first one was
trying to find objective,  but not universally applicable characteristics for nation,  to define it  as
language, culture, territory and history.  Among these were Friedrich Meinecke who divides the
nations  in  two  types,  Kulturnation and  Staatsnation,  based  on  whether  their  core  is  mainly  a
common culture or whether it is the force of common political history.22  A similar approach had
another scholar named Otto Bauer, who saw the historical development as an objective feature that
forms each nation as a “community of destiny” and by which each nation acquires its own and
personal nature.23 The second stream of thought was of a lesser popularity at first, but eventually
and mainly after the second world war dominated the academic field on this matter. Its main idea
was that nations should be defined not by their objective features, but by the will of its potential
members and their sense of belongingness to one nation. A predecessor of this group was a french
philosopher Ernest Renan who said at his famous lecture in 1882 at Sorbonne, that the nation is a
spiritual principle, which arose from changes and developments of history. Thus, it is a spiritual
community and not a group of people bound to a land or soil. It is formed by two things: common
ownership of rich memories and approval and a wish to live together.24 
Despite the differences,  the distinction between these two streams is not strict.  Scholars
trying  to  define  nations  by  objective  characteristics  were  aware  of  the  necessity  of  the  self-
awareness  of  its  members.  Similarly,  scholars  of  the  other  stream knew there  can  be  no  self-
awareness, if there are no common features that would make the members of a community feel, that
they have something more in common with each other than with other people.
What has changed in the academic field on this topic in the second half of the 20th century, is
first of all the abandonment of the primordial concept of nations. Secondly,  between the objective
and subjective approach to define a nation, there has been a general transfer towards the subjective
approach and a consensus, that the nation can not be defined only ethnically and without a sense of
self-awareness among its members. Lastly, and as an impact of the first point, if nations are not
something eternal and universal, than they had to appear or come to existence in some point in
history. Here, most scholars start to see nationalism as a premise or condition for the existence of
the nation. Therefore, many authors have given up on the need to find a definition of the nation and
the focus has since then, the focus has been pointed to the study of nationalism itself.  These are
22 Friedrich Meinecke, “Oběcne o národu, národním státu a světoobčanství,“ in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. 
Miroslav Hroch (Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2003), 47.
23 Otto Bauer, “Národnostní otázka a sociální demokracie,“ in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. Miroslav Hroch 
(Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2003), 37.
24 Ernest, Renan, “Co je to národ?” in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. Miroslav Hroch (Praha: Sociologické 
nakladatelství, 2003), 33.
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more or less features of a wider range of approaches, generally referred to as modernist theories,
which this work will be based on. 
Belonging to these modernist theoriescan be seen the work of Hans Kohn, whose scholarly
interest brought up new looks on the ideology of nationalism (these will be discussed in the next
chapter), but his definition of the nation as a “creation of nationalism” had a big impact on the next
generation and was fully developed and promoted later by Ernest Gellner25, who influenced many
others by the conception, that the nations were made by the ideology of nationalism. However,
often overlooked is the fact that Gellner studied the social conditions of the societies, where it led to
nationalism. He saw industrialization, or the social changes affected by it as a major predisposition
to its emergence. For Ernest Gellner, culture is universal and eternal, nations are not. Culture is a
shared means of verbal expression, mimics, gestures, attitudes, way of dressing, cuisine habits, and
many others.26 Everyone has a culture and culture had always been.  The variety of cultures in the
world is, however, huge. Number of cultures in the world defined by language is around 8000. The
number of nation states is only about 200.27 So what is the difference? Is it that some cultures are
also nations and some are not? What is the process that a culture has to go through to become a
nation? According to Gellner’s work, some cultures by their dominance and predispositions spread
and absorbed other smaller  cultures to form a modern nation.  Other cultures somehow merged
together and created a new modern nation formed by all of them. 
One of the exceptions from the mentioned trend in this era was the attempt to define the
nation by Anthony Smith, who merges the modernist and traditionalist approach. He defines it as a
population  that  shares  a  historical  territory,  common myths,  historical  memories,  mass  culture,
common economy and common legal  rights  and duties  obligatory for  all  its  members.  28 This
definition was rare in this  period, due to the stress on objective features mentioned to define a
nation. 
The difference of  Smith’s  approach from his  contemporaries  can be mainly seen in  the
contrast  to  subjective  definitions  of  Deutsche  “community  of  complementary  social
communication”29 and Benedict Anderson, which describes it as a “political community created in
the imagination, a community bonded and sovereign in its essence”. It is imaginary, because the
members of this community imagine the connection, which they have with the other members of the
community, who they will never meet.30
25 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 23.
26 Gellner, Nationalism, 1.
27 Ernest Gellner, Nacionalizmus, (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2003), 8.
28 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 14.
29 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 27.
30 Benedict Anderson, Představy spoločenství: Úvahy o původu a šíření nacionalismu, (Praha: Karolinum, 2008), 22.
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 The approach of my work will be mainly based on the modernist theory, mostly on the
concepts of Gellner and Hroch. However, and despite the fact that the objective criteria were, as a
key factor, overcame in these modernist theories, they can be viewed as a predisposition to the
formation of national identity and they present a major role in the construction of an imagined
community.  For that, I will be trying to identify the objective criteria, which were crucial in the
Arab nation building process in forming what later would become the modern Arab nation. And
also, I will be examining the attitude of early members of the Arab movement towards these criteria.
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1.2. Defining Nationalism
Similarly to the term nation, the nationalism is not any less hard to capture or provide a
consensus on it as a term, or as a phenomenon. Different approaches of scholars on this matter are
rooted in their different attitude to nationalism on the scale from being primordial to constructivist
and also in the diversity of nationalism, or nationalisms in term of usefulness and harmfulness.
Hence, there has been difficulties with working with this term as a neutral analytical tool and there
was always a distinction between the positive and negative side of nationalism. Most influential was
the dichotomy of Hans Kohn, which distinguishes western and eastern nationalism as progressive
and  reactionary,  where  the  first  one  is  positive,  liberal  and democratic  and  the  second one  is
backward. 31
Another  such  distinction  is  diachronic,  where  nationalist  ideologies  of  the  19 th century
represent the liberal progressive version and the 20th century nationalism is the negative aggressive
form of the originally progressive ideology. 32
This distinction is present in the works of all authors. An example of that is Ernest Gellner,
in whose work this distinction does not have a central role, however is present as various features
and  conditions  of  the  same ideology in  different  times  and places.  These  are  portrayed in  his
division into time periods and geographical zones.33 
Anderson does not provide a specific definition of nationalism. He criticizes the notion to
look upon nationalism as just another one of the ideologies and suggests to look upon it as form of
modern religion. He sees nationalism not as something that replaced the old religious order in its
process of gradual disintegration, but rather that it grew out of it. More specifically out of its two
cultural systems (religious communities and dynastic empires) and distinguishes itself from them.34
Accordingly,  instead  of  trying  to  define  the  term,  it  is  more  fruitful  to  try  to  understand  the
historical and cultural roots that led to its foundation. This approach is very suitable for the situation
of the Arab nationalism, which grew on the grounds of the Islamic religious communities and the
dynastic  Ottoman Empire.  To what  extent  it  incorporates  the  values  and features  of  these  two
cultural systems and how it distinguishes itself from them, will be seen in the following parts of the
work.
31 Hans Kohn, “Nacionalismus,” in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. Miroslav Hroch (Praha: Sociologické 
nakladatelství, 2003), 87.
32 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 32.
33 Gellner, Nationalism, 37-58.
34 Anderson, Představy spoločenství, 28.
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To use one word (nationalism) to cover the two aspects of the phenomenon is what causes
the  hard  gripability  and  vagueness  of  the  term.  Hence,  among  the  works  of  many,  the  term
nationalism got stabilized on its more negative side as it can be also seen in Miroslav Hroch’s book,
where he works with it as national egoism. 35 
For the positive side of it, new terms are often occurring to distinguish it as patriotism, used
by Otto Dann.36 John Armstrong, in his research of nation building processes extending all the way
to the middle ages, was aware that using nationalism is out of place, as it was not present in that
time and due to the general consensus, that it is connected with the modern age. Therefore, he used
the term national identity, which more suitable to work with this periods of history and also more
neutral. 
Proceeding with this approach was the work of Anthony Smith and his concept of multiple
identities.  National  identity  is  one  of  the  identities  that  the  person  can  identify  himself  with.
National identity is closely linked with the ethnic identity and is mainly formed by the feeling of
continuity across the generations, i.e. subjective aspects as myths of common origin and common
history.37
Smith combines the modernist and traditionalist approach. He criticizes the modernists as
Gellner  and  Anderson  for  marking  the  nations  as  a  construct  of  modern  world  and  not
acknowledging the importance of pre-modern cultures and the ethnic ties of modern nations.  38
Nevertheless and despite of Smith’s focus on the objective criteria, his approach is not primordial.
He focuses on the ethno-cultral attributes of national identity. According to him, national identities
are usually focused around five fundamental features, which are as follows: 
1. a historic territory, or homeland
2.common myths and historical memories 
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members39
35  Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 34.
36  Ibid, 33.
37  Anthony Smith, “Etnický základ národní identity,“ in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. Miroslav Hroch 
(Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2003), 276.
38  Anthony Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9. 
39  Smith, National Identity, 14.
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The conceptions of Gellner and Anderson however do not differ radically from Smith’s. They all
focus on the predispositions of formation of modern nations. The difference is, which factors they
favor.  While  Smith  focuses  on  national  mythology,  Anderson  prefers  the  development  of
communication  means,  capitalism  and  colonialism.  Gellner  prioritizes  economical  and  social
conditions of the industrial period.
In my work I will try to stick to working with nationalism as a neutral analytical tool based
on Gellner’s theoretical definition of it as: “It is a political principle, in which cultural similarity is
the  major  social  bound and therefore  it  is  an  effort  to  statehood  and  for  political  reality  to
correspond  with  cultural  reality”.40 In  the  periods  before  the  Arab  national  movement  got  its
political aims, I will be using the concepts of Smith and John Armstrong of national and ethnic
identity and Otto Dann’s term of patriotism, as well.
40  Gellner, “Nacionalismus,” 405.
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1.3. Origins of Nationalism
The different  concepts  and approaches  in  the academic  field that  were presented  in  the
previous  two chapters can be reflected in the attitude towards the formation and emergence of
nationalism. The scholars, who see in nationalism a creating force for nations, maintain the idea that
nations are cultural constructs, a creation of intellectuals and politicians. This statement, however,
will merge a wide range of different approaches, which vary in the degree of their radicalism i.e. to
what extent they acknowledge the importance of the objective features, and how they explain the
spread of the ideology from the places where it originated to the other parts of the world. 41 
It  is  also  important  to  understand,  that  the  distinction  between  the  modernists  and
primordialists is not that radical. Not all the interpretations that consider nations to be created by
nationalism are constructivist  theories.  For example Hans Kohn who is  the predecessor  of this
approach, also acknowledges the relevance of the objective cultural and historical characteristics,
which were in fact the reason for that different paths of western and eastern nationalism. That is the
key point of his theory. 
An extremist approach can be seen in the work of Ellie Kedourie, who is on the edge of the
spectrum of academic research on this matter, and is rather a minority voice amongst academicians.
The first sentence of his article is expressing his approach completely. “Nationalism is an ideology
that was invented in Europe in the beginning of the 19th century”.  42 Kedourie says  it  is  not a
universal phenomenon, but a product of European thought in the last 150 years.43 In his theory,
nationalism  connects  two  human  natural  emotions.  The  first  one  is  love  for  the  land,  where
someone lives  and for  his  own group or  community.  The second one is  xenofobia,  dislike  for
strangers and unwillingness to accept them to their group. These two emotions do not have any
anthropological  cause,  nor  do  they  posit  any  relation  between  the  state  and  the  members.
Nationalism  claims  these  two  emotions,  justifies  them  anthropologically  and  makes  them  the
cornerstone of a political principle.
Ernest  Gellner openly distinguishes himself  from Kedourie.  He acknowledges,  that  their
theories  have  one  common  feature,  which  is  that  nationalism  is  not  universal  or  natural
phenomenon.  Gellner  says,  that  Kedourie  made this  fact  most  clear  and apparent.  Gellner  also
41  Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 41.
42  Ellie Kedourie, “Nacionalismus,” in Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus, ed. Hroch, Miroslav (Praha: Sociologické 
nakladatelství, 2003), 101.
43  Ibid, 104.
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admits, that he did not openly criticize the supposition of universality of nationalism before reading
Kedourie’s book.44 For all that, on the scale of being modernist or primordial, both these authors are
regarded modernist. They picture the ideology as a phenomenon of the modern world and not a
universal  concept,  although,  Gellner  does  not  consider  nationalism an accidental  occurrence of
European history. So on the scale on seeing nationalism as accidental (as Kedourie) or necessary (as
primordialists), he stands in the middle. Nationalism is not a necessary phenomenon, it does not lie
in the nature of human being, but is also not an accident.45 It is rather  necessary consequence of
specific social conditions. 
Nationalism  occurs  when  special  conditions  are  found.  It  is  not  obligatory,  that  these
conditions occur, but when they do it is inevitable or at least understandable and logical, that it leads
to  nationalism.  Gellner  refers  to  these  conditions  as  industrialism.  In  my understanding,  what
Gellner  here  means  by industrialism is  not  the  mechanical  production  and factories  itself  as  a
precondition  to  nationalism,  but  rather  the  social  conditions  that  industrialized  society  creates.
These are the loss of bond between people. The social hierarchy of the feudal age, where every
person was bound to the society by his social status and religious affiliation came to an end with the
modern age. Qualified labor demanded a huge scale of job opportunities, where candidates could
not be assigned according to their social status, but according to their skills. This required education
in a mass level which in return required a codified and united language and a level of literacy
among the ordinary people. In short, this produced high culture among masses and social mobility.
Thereto the physical mobility, represented in urbanization and movement towards the centers of
industry and formal equality of all the citizens made life for ordinary people markedly different.
The poor peasant who barely knew in which kingdom he was living, and for who the edge of known
world was the local landlord and the priest, suddenly became directly and without an intermediary,
connected to the state. 
In that world, formal equality did not mean there was no difference between rich and poor,
but the difference was present in the position people had in the bureaucratic system or in their bank
accounts. This difference, however, does not penetrate to the depth of human soul and does not
create social statuses for people. The differences of social positions in the modern society are spread
along some kind of continuum and have no specific boundaries affirmed by any rituals or habits.46 




The identity of enlightenment in this era rested in something universal. It lacked any connection
with cultural or political borders.47 Theoretically, it could lead to a universal global culture. All the
cultural nuances in the world would merge as drops of rain into one puddle.48 That is what all the
internationalist- universalists would expect. However, for the human kind it is natural to merge into
groups, to identify themselves with a body larger than themselves and distinguish themselves from
others. Therefore, the drops of rain do not merge into one big puddle, but create many various,
large, often mutually hostile puddles.49
The enlightenment universalistic society created a vacuum of social bound i.e. it tore down
the old bounds and did not create new. That is a fertile ground for some new bounding ideology to
take place and give people a new, more emotional identity. Nationalism, as a product of reactionary
romanticism, found in this vacuum a perfect ground to spread.
Gellner stresses the casual effect of the social conditions on nationalism, but as we saw now
social  conditions  themselves  did  not  lead  to  nationalism,  but  created  space  for  the  spread  of
nationalism,  as  an  ideology  from above.  This  is  another  objective  characteristic,  even  though
Gellner does not attribute it  such importance.  It is possible to picture it is as two equal causes
happening at the same time. The ideology would not emerge, if there would be no social conditions
demanding for it on one hand. On the other hand, if the ideas of the thinkers of romanticism did not
appear, perhaps an ideology based on something different than ethnicity would seize this vacuum
and set different principles of identification and self-determination.  
This  characteristic of nation formation which Gellner provides  is  centralized on western
Europe. It gives an explanation how the first modern nations were formed in states such as France
and England, but sometimes it is hardly applied for the other parts of Europe and the world. The
author himself is aware of the shortage of this conception on countries such as Greece.50 And so,
one of the goals of this work will be to find, whether Gellner’s theory can be applied to the situation
of the Arab world. For that purpose, it is necessary to see whether the features that Gellner describes
as the social conditions of the modern world (the loss of social bond and social structure of the pre-
modern  society,  the  appearance  of  anonymity,  mobility,  semantic  nature  of  work,  context-free
communication and mass education) could be found in the Arab world, in the period before Arab
nationalism became a leading ideology. The time when Arab nationalism reached its fulfillment, is




50  Ibid, 41.
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of two elected bodies- the  Syrian General Congress and the Syrian Cabinet, which adopted the
ideology  of  Arab  nationalism.  Because  of  that,  the  period  for  the  study  of  Gellner’s  social
conditions will be approximately from the half of the 19th century to the end of WWI.
Anderson  is  often  considered  to  be  a  follower  of  Gellner’s  theory.  Nevertheless,  he
distinguishes himself from his conception, that nationalism creates nations where they do not exist51
(Gellner,  despite  of  what  we  analyzed  previously  asserts,  that  some  times  nationalism creates
nations out of nothing, e.x. Estonia). Other than that, Anderson is also criticized for explaining how
the ideology could spread, but not explaining why it spread.  Reading his book carefully, we see that
the bigger part is devoted to the cultural and historical predispositions that outpaced the formation
of nations independently on the hopes of nationalists. 
On the example of these scholars we can see how nominally different approaches do not
really differ that much in their essence. Miroslav Hroch says that it is for the sake of originality, that
every scholar promotes his conception to be original and distinguishes himself from many other
scholars.52 Most  of  the  times,  the  real  difference  in  various  approaches  rests  only  in  stressing
different causes as a key factor to the formation of nationalism.
Most  of  the  academic  works  takes  into  consideration  and  questions  the  role  of  all  the
features below on the formation of nationalism:
1. Ties with the past
2. Language and ethnicity
3. Modernization
4. Conflict of interest
5. Emotions and identity
In the following parts  of the work I  will  identify the objective criteria which constitute
points  one  and  two,  and  analyze  how  they  formed  the  features  of  the  modern  Arab  nation.
Subsequently, I will be analyzing how modernization, embodied in Gellner’s concept of the social
conditions of the modern world, shaped the stages of the Arab nation building process. Lastly, I will
examine  the  power  struggle  and conflict  of  interests  that  accompanied  the  emergence of  Arab
nationalism, and find how this conflict influenced some of the Arab elite in adopting the ideology of
Arab nationalism. Emotions and identity in the 5th point, are features which are linked to to the last
51  Anderson, Představy spoločenství, 22.
52 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 42.
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phases of nationalism and describe the stage when it becomes a mass movement and the majority of
population adopts the national identity. In the period studied in this work, which ends with WWI,
Arab nationalism did not reach that phase, therefore this feature will not be analyzed.
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1.4. Different Scenarios of Forming a Nation
The path towards modern nations had different model scenarios. In Europe alone, scholars
usually recognize three or four regional zones.  53 The first one is western Europe where, as we
mentioned earlier, pre-modern dynastic kingdoms existed for centuries overlapping with borders of
culturally similar ethnic groups. This is the zone where the modern nation was established through
an inner revolution.54
The second zone is represented by countries as Germany and Italy, situated in a central stripe
of Europe reaching from the North to the South. Here, high culture, official language and literature
were present for a long time and the population was ethno-geographically quite compact. But they
did  not  have a  state.  Therefore,  formation  of  these nations  went  through a  process  of  national
struggle, where the goal was to unite, but not to liberate.55
The last third zone are the multi-ethnic empires of easten Europe: Habsburg, Ottoman and
Russian Empire. Here, in the process of national struggle, non-ruling ethnic groups had to split from
the unit. What differentiated these ethnic groups from a modern nation was, that they lacked a full
social composition and culture in their native language.56
The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire can apparently not be compared to the first zone
in Europe. But it is also visible that they do not adopt fully for neither the second, nor the third
zone.  Therefore,  I  will  study  which  features  had  the  Arab  world  in  common  with  these  two
scenarios. 
53 Hroch recognizes three zones (page 48 in Národy nejsou dílem náhody) and Gellner four (pages 52-54 in 
Nationalism). The fourth zone are countries of the communist block, therefore are not concerned in this work.  
54 Hroch, národy nejsou dílem náhody, 48.
55 Gellner, Nationalism, 52-54.
56 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 50.
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1.5. Periodization of the Path Towards a Modern Nation
Based on Miroslav Hroch’s conception, I will be also using his chronological periodization
of the nation building process. Here as a criterion is chosen the nation, defined as a stage when all
or almost all of the potential members agree, that they belong to it. To achieve this state, the nation
building process had to go through three stages, which are defined by Hroch as stages A, B and C.
As a first premise for identification with a nation, it is necessary to define the homeland,
study the history, codify the language, characterize national culture and traditions and specify the
members of the nation or an ethnic group. This was usually done by scholars on the rulers demands
or out of personal interest. Their researches and findings were important for the later phases of the
nation building process, but it would be exaggerated to assume that their intentions were to start a
nationalist movement. This stage is called phase A.
The second phase B is when a specific group of people of the ethnic group, usually more
educated or people with the local power, start to spread national awareness and identity to all the
members of the ethnic group. This phase has an agitation character and advocates mainly cultural,
linguistic and social goals and only rarely political ones.
Only when the phase B gains most of the population for the nationalist course and has a
materialized power,  the agitation character changes to a mobilization character  of the phase C.
During this phase, the movement acquires a political program. The movement or national struggle is
successful, when it reaches autonomy or independence.57
I  will  work with this  periodization and will  define through which phases went the Arab
nation building process during the studied period, from its beginning until WWI.
57 Ibid, 54.
23
2. The Middle East and the New World Order
2.1. The Ottoman Empire and the West
The key to the intellectual crisis of the Eastern Muslim world can be found in the shift of
power relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, from the 16th to the 20th century. In
1453 when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, turning it into the new capital of their Islamic
Empire Istanbul, and after their successful advance into the heartlands of Christian Europe and brief
conquest  of  most  of  the  Arabic  territories  from Iraq  to  eastern  Morocco,  their  power  seemed
unstoppable.58 The Ottomans were like most of the Turkish dynasties Sunni Muslims, but  their
Sunni character was mainly underlined by gaining the holy cities of Islam- Mecca and Medina and
the base of Sunni Islamic thought Al-Azhar in Cairo under their territories, and was strengthened by
their opposition to the Shia Safavid Persian Empire. By this rapid expansion of the Ottomans, the
Sunni Islamic world seemed to be revived in its glory and far ahead of Europe.
During the 16th and 17th century the Ottoman Empire presented a dominant political force
due to its two main military bodies. The first was a powerful navy based in Istanbul from where it
dominated the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean and secured a lucrative sea trade. The other
was a tremendous land army using the latest innovations of gunpowder and siege weapons in the
time when the feudal armies of Europe were equipped mainly with pikes. 59
The factors that led to the shift of power between the East and the West in the following
centuries can be divided in two major sets. One of them was the internal signs of weakness and
developments  inside  the  empire  itself.  After  the  death  of  the  tenth  sultan  Suleyman  the
Magnificent60 in 1566 the empire was confronted with several problems as unqualified rulers and
economic difficulties. Inflation was causing that the army could not be properly paid and equipped
and corruption and bribery spread among government clerks who witnessed cuts off of their salaries
as well.61
The decay of power showed up on battlefields very soon. Since 1656 the Ottomans were
defeated on sea by the Venetians, retreated from Vienna after a second attempt to capture the city,
and lost territories in nowaday Hungary, Croatia, Romania and the northern coast of the Black Sea
to the Habsburg and Russian empires.62  In 1774 after a lost war against the Russians, the Ottoman
58 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Midle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 39.
59 Ibid, 42-43.
60 In the West commonly known as Suleyman the Magnificent, while in the East known as Kanuni (Lawgiver).
61 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 22.
62 John Obert Voll, "Foundations for Renewal and reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
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Empire had to sign a treaty containing the loss of Romania and parts of the Crimean Peninsula and
granting the  Russians  two vital  privileges:  access  to  the Turkish Straits  and the  patronage and
protection of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.63 The second one proved later
to be a useful tool for Russian interventions and later on interventions on behalf of the Great Powers
who also found their protected people in the Ottoman Empire.
By the 18th century, the deplorable situation of the empire and its decline must have been
obvious to every close observer. The Janissaries, who in the 16th century were one of the best armies
in Europe had long ago lost their discipline and interest in fighting. These corps, were during the
peak of the empire, formed of captured Christian boys from the Balkan who were converted to
Islam and trained to  be a  professional  and loyal  fighting  force.  They were not  allowed to  get
married, so that their loyalty to the sultan will not be disrupted by social bounds. However, the last
enslaved Christians from the Balkan were in the 16th century and later on, the Janissaries were
allowed to marry and their membership became hereditary.64 Because of that, the Janissaries of the
18th century lacked training and were more drawn by commerce than fighting.
The decline of Ottoman power was also visible in the inability of the central government to
control its provinces, where local leaders acquired power, set semi-autonomous governments and
were granted the right of tax farming and no longer provided soldiers to the empire. What is more,
the  religious  authorities  also  well  acquired  a  degree  of  autonomy  and  started  to  act  in  an
independent way.65
 The second factor that caused the power drift between the East and the West had external
character. Another movement that took place far behind the borders of Islam caused that the Islamic
world found itself under the supremacy of Europe and the Western world. The Renaissance period
which started as a cultural movement, is considered to be the bridge between the Middle Ages and
modern history in Europe. This period brought new social and political orders and expansion in
sciences. Among these, the most influential scientific novelties were the geographical discoveries
that opened new naval routes for the Europeans to Asia around Africa, cutting off the Ottoman
income from the trade passing through their empire. The discovery of America led to the flow of
gold and silver from there to Europe, which then led to the raise of prices causing inflation in the
Ottoman  Empire. Above  all,  the  industrial  revolution  which  later  in  the  history  brought  new
manufacturing technologies, which were cheaper and faster than the traditional ones.66
Centuries," in Oxford History of Islam, ed.John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 510.
63 Cleveland and Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, 53.
64 Christoph K. Neumann, Dějiny Turecka (Praha: NLN, 2014) 76-77.
65 Abul-Karim Rafeq, "A Different Balance of Power: Europe and the Middle East in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries,” in A Companion to the History of the Middle East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 232.
66 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 29.
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These factors have strengthened the European economy incomparably to the Ottoman one.
Until  the  16th century,  this  would  not  have had such a  strong impact  on the  Ottoman empire,
because its  economy was alike the other empires almost totally independent and self-sufficient.
However this gradually started to change from the 16th century into a system of so called modern
world economy. By the 19th century, the Ottoman empire was completely integrated to this system
and therefore could hardly resist the dominance of the European economy in an open market.67 The
cause  of  this,  was  the  introduction  of  European  capital  to  the  Ottoman  lands.  The  Ottoman
craftsmen could not compete with the cheaper manufactured goods imported from Europe and the
farmers, instead of producing for their own consumption, began producing cash crops as tobacco
and cotton for the world market. Raw materials were exported from the Anatiolian and Persian
fields directly to Europe to be used in the production of manufactured goods and then sold back to
the empire with profit.
This  situation was  accompanied  by  commercial  agreements  between  the  Ottoman  and
European governments  called  the  Capitulations,  which  gave European merchants  specific  trade
privileges, tax free status and low rates on import and export. More than that, in the 18 th century
which the European merchants had, were delegated on some of the local population of the Ottoman
Empire as representatives who were always non-Muslim, usually Christians or Jews. This allowed
these communities to prosper from the trade with Europe which created an unpleasant effect on the
Muslim-Christian relations.68
 Europe was advancing  also in the intellectual field. The Protestant reform led by Martin
Luther and John Calvin, eroded people's faith in the Papacy and questioned much of their traditional
thought. This movement however, similarly to the Renaissance had no impact on Muslims, neither
was noticed by them. The first intellectual movement of the West that had an actual effect on the
world of Islam were the ideas of the French Revolution in 1789.69
As a result of all the above mentioned influences, the economical situation of the Ottoman
Empire in the 18th century was not sustainable and the government in order to pay for imported
goods fell  into  debt.  By the end of  the  19th century,  the  Ottoman empire  became a  peripheral
economy of  the  capitalist  western  Europe70.  This  evolution  and  developments  caused  that  the
empire was no longer a military threat to Europe. On the other hand, it suddenly became a problem
for the Europeans in a different sense. This problem, in diplomacy known as the Eastern Question,
was how to handle the “ill man on the Bosphorus” (a declining Ottoman Empire). If the empire
67 James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 40.
68 Cleveland and Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, 60-61.
69 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 40.
70 Eduard Gombár, Moderní dějiny islámských zemí (Praha: Karolinum, 1999), 19.
26
collapsed it would affect the system of balance of power in Europe. The Russians were very keen
on encroaching into the zones of influence of the Ottomans and extending their territories towards
the straights and access to the Mediterranean, which worried the rest of Europe. But everybody
wanted their share of cake and the rivalry could lead to disastrous consequences. Therefore, all the
European governments were carefully watching whatever was happening in Istanbul.
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2.2. The Age of Reform in Istanbul
The Ottoman government realizing the inequality in the balance of power, tried to prevent
the further decline of their lands by adopting some of the western style reforms and novelties. In
order to introduce the reforms, it had to centralize the fractured provinces of the empire and bring
the periphery under direct control. Sultan Selim III instituted the first reforms by the end of the 18th
century, modernized the army on the European model, invited European specialists to train the army
and opened the first Ottoman embassies in Europe.71 However, opposition from the circles of elites
who mostly benefited from the decline and decentralization of the empire and were keen to hold
their positions, turned against him. In 1806 Selim III was deposed by the Janissaries.72
In the 19th century the Ottoman Empire started to face some serious problems in the Balkan
which were accompanied by the European encroachment on its territory.  The Christian subjects
viewed the Ottomans as rulers who dominated their  lands and differed from them, not only in
language and ethnicity (this was not of significant importance until then) but mainly in adherence of
another religion that viewed them as a second class citizens that had only limited rights in the
country.  Therefore,  these  Balkan  Christians  were  easily  prone  to  the  new  nationalist  ideas  of
romanticism coming from Christian Europe and could promise them independence.73
In this age, Selim III’s successor Mahmud II carefully tried to continue with the reforms
when he felt secure ground under his feet. When the Janissaries opposed him as they did Selim III,
he  massacred  them inspired  by his  vassal  Muhammad Ali  in  Egypt  who did  the  same to  the
Mamluks and got rid of the main obstacle standing in the way of reform. Afterwards, Mahmud II
continued with reforming the country and brought European advisers to teach at the two newly
established western  style  educational  institutions:  the  Army Medical  School  and the  School  of
Military Sciences. The language of instruction here was French. Beside the military, bureaucracy
was also reorganized and new schools for the training of these officials to these posts were opened
as well.74
The reforms reached their peak in the Tanzimat (reorganization) era stretching from 1839-
1876. The new institutions,  opened by Selim III  and Mahmud II,  had to  be filled with trained
officials and experts. These were not recruited from the graduates of the traditional religious schools
anymore, but instead from the graduates of the new state schools.75 These westernized bureaucrats
71 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 42-48.
72 Ibid, 53-54.
73 Cleveland and Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, 75-76.
74 Voll, „Foundations for Renewal and Reform,” 523-525
75 Cleveland and Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, 81-82.
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then were the ones who promoted the reforms of the Tanzimat. The most prominent of them were
Reshid, Ali, and Fuad Pasha. The political and ideological essence of the Tanzimat was summed in
two royal  decrees  from 1839 and 1856 issued in  the  name of  the  Sultan  to  his  people  and a
nationality law in 1869. The dcerees and the nationality law together promulgated a principle of
Ottoman citizenship. 76 These laws were purposely proclaimed to secure the loyalty of the Christian
people of the Balkan,  who were becoming increasingly prone to  the above mentioned ideas  of
nationalism.
Applying  the  theories  of  nationalism and division  of  the  different  paths  that  led  to  the
formation of modern nations in Europe, mentioned in chapter one, we can see that these Ottoman
royal decrees and the nationality law were an attempt to imitate the western European (probably the
French)  model.  In  this  model,  various  ethnic  groups  that  had  been  ruled  under  one  state  for
centuries,  melted  into  one  high  culture  and  formed  a  modern  nation.  However,  the  historical
developments  in  France  in  the previous  centuries  radically differed from those in  the  Ottoman
Empire. While in France the different ethnicities influenced each other and mixed with each other
for centuries, in the Ottoman Empire the attempt to introduce a unified nationality or something
similar  was never  made until  the Tanzimat period.  On the contrary,  the difference between the
various ethnic and religious groups was underlined by the system of millets- a system of division of
the  non-  Muslim  people  into  partially  autonomous  societies,  which  was  established  from  the
conquest  of the Christian lands.  In the millets,  the members  could enjoy relative freedom, self
governance, and legal matters inside heir community were operated by their own laws. On the other
side, they were not allowed to hold position in the Ottoman government and were banned from
entry to the military. Because of this they never developed the conscience of being equal members
of the Ottoman Empire but rather the once ruled by the Muslim majority. By the 19 th century they
were more aware of their difference then they were in the first years after the Ottoman conquest.77
Therefore, by then it was too late to try to persuade them that they are an equal member of the
empire and win their loyalty towards a unifying, religion exceeding identity.
76 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 107, 116; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 74.
77 Hroch, Národy nejsou dílem náhody, 57-58
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2.3. The Egyptian Reform and Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi
While the Ottomans were occupied by their decline and the shift of power towards Europe
since the 18th century, the Arab world lay in ignorance towards what was happening in Europe.
After the great days of the Umayyad and Abbasid empires, the Arabs became ruled by non-Arab
dynasties and military classes of former slaves from Turkish and Caucasian origins, and later by the
Ottomans.  They  accepted  the  role  of  second  class  citizens  ruled  by  other  Muslims  and  were
unaware of the decay of their  civilization.  They followed the same way of life as they did for
centuries, confident that Islam provides them with all that is needed to live rightly.78
All this changed in 1798 when Napoleon Bonaparte in an attempt to threaten British access
to India disembarked on the shores of Egypt, destroyed the Mamluk forces in the Battle of the
Pyramids and briefly conquered the country. This was not only a display of military power but also
the scientific advancement of Europe, as Napoleon brought with himself a team of scientists and
orientalists. Despite the fact that the French occupation did not last long and Napoleon was driven
out  by  the  British  and  the  Ottomans  in  180379,  this  event  deeply  affected  the  course  of  the
forthcoming Arabic history.
Profiting from the chaos and vacuum of power caused by the retreat of the French army,
Muhammad Ali, an Albanian officer of the Ottoman army, seized power. Realizing the practical
advantages of the scientific novelties of the West, he decided to introduce reforms. For that purpose
he got rid of the traditional forces of the country (the Mamluks) who reemerged after the French
retreat and posed a competition for power for him. By eliminating them, he could use their wealth
to facilitate his reforms.80 This event later inspired the already mentioned Sultan Mamud II in his
treatment of the Janissaries.
Muhammad  Ali  introduced  military,  agricultural  and  social  reforms,  opened  technical
schools, sent Egyptian students on missions to Europe to study and translate scientific and military
books.  His  reforms  were,  however,  aimed  strictly  at  increasing  the  power  of  his  country  and
increasing  his  power  in  it.  He  made  no  attempt  to  to  reform  the  political  system  and  also
discouraged the interest of students in politics and humanities and anything other than military and
technical sciences.81 Despite that, a gradual awareness of the life in Europe, its literature and ideas
of  Enlightenment  began  to  emerge  among  the  Egyptians.  From this  generation  came  the  first
modern Egyptian thinker Rafi al-Tahtawi.
78    Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 35-37.
79    Cleveland and Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, 65.
80    Gombár, Moderní dějiny islámských zemí, 71.
81  Ladislav Bareš and Rudolf Veselý and Eduard Gombár, Dějiny Egypta (Praha: NLN, 2009), 415.
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Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, who was one of the most influential thinkers preaching these new ideas,
belongs  to  the  era  which  Albert  Hourani  classifies  as  the  first  generation  of  modern  Muslim
thinkers, that roughly stretches from 1830 to 1870. He belongs there with the Ottoman Tanzimat
reformers Resid, Ali and Fuad. In their perception they were aware that the West has surpassed the
East technologically, but the revelation of Islam was the last and the most perfect. Therefore, the
Muslim and the Ottoman way of life was supreme to the European one and perfectly sound. There
was no need to change anything in the fundamentals of that. It would only take to borrow certain
things, that are not in contradiction with the Sharia, from Europe and the gap would be closed.82
Tahtawi introduced one Western idea to the Arab world that was not present yet and that is
the idea of patriotism. In the world of Islam, love for the homeland was not an unknown concept,
but it did not have political significance nor was nationality connected with territoriality.83 Tahtawi
spoke of he world formed by nations that are connected with specific countries and have their own
characteristics. For Tahtawi, the fatherland was Egypt and the Egyptians were a nation. In the same
time, his counterparts in the center of the Ottoman Empire were independently promulgating similar
ideas. For them, the fatherland was the Ottoman Empire and all its inhabitants formed an Ottoman
nation. 84
It is interesting to see how the role of historical developments and statehood outmatched any
linguistic or ethnic features in defining a nation. These thinkers accepted the role of the dynastic
state and applied the concept of nationality from the French model on it.85 The Ottoman Empire was
an example of the state unit exceeding the ethnic units and was formed by many of them. Arabic
speaking Egypt, which under Muhammad Ali functioned practically as an autonomous country, was
on the other hand a state unit much smaller than ethno-linguistic unit of the Arabic speaking world.
What these two concepts of nationality had in common, was the idea of a nation derived from the
sovereignty of a state.
For the Ottoman thinkers, the idea of Ottomanism had clear political consequences. In the
case of Tahtawi,  his  Egyptian patriotism could not have the same political  implication because
Egypt was not the protector of the whole Muslim Umma as was the Ottoman Empire and Egypt was
nominally still part of it. In Tahtawis’s work, his Egyptian identity is penetrated by his Muslim
identity and his Egyptian patriotism is mixed with his Ottomanism.
This generation of thinkers lived in a time when Europe did not pose danger to the East.
These men were aware that the West had somehow surpassed the East,  and were aware of the
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necessity of reform.86 Therefore, we call them reformers. They were however, sure that Islam and
the Muslim way of life is essentially superior to the European one, and for that there is no need to
reform the fundamentals. For that reason, they can be called conservative reformers.
86  Ibid, 81.
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2.4. The Second Generation of Thinkers: A Muslim Response to Imperialism
In the years 1870-1900, which by Hourani are classified as a second generation, western
progress  became  associated  with  imperial  ventures  that  marked  the  mutual  relations  between
Europe and the East. The Europeans criticized the Muslim way of life calling it backward. Because
of that, the Muslim intellectuals took a defensive position in response. In comparison with the era of
Tahtawi, Europe posed a political and cultural threat to these thinkers.87 The confidence that Eastern
culture and Islam is superior to the West was gone. Most of the energy consumed by these scholars
was on the “denial that Islam was inferior to Europe”.88
In Istanbul,  an opposition to the blind folded imitations of the West and the authocratic
government of Ali and Fuad Pasha emerged, when the inefficiency of the Tanzimat showed no
results on the battlefields during the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878. Known under the name the Young
Ottomans, they were journalists and intellectuals conversant with the ideas of the West, yet they
were not wholehearted westernizers. They were aware of belonging to an Ottoman society that also
included non-Turks and non-Muslims.89 These men were Ottoman patriots who wanted to combine
Western liberal system by demanding a constitution with Islamic values of their society. In 1876,
they succeeded in deposing the Sultan Abdulaziz and proclaiming a constitution. The new Sultan
Abdulhamid II was however committed to eliminate them and seizing an opportunity, he dismissed
the parliament and suspended the constitution after two years.90 For the next decades to come, he
governed as an autocratic ruler.
The ideas of response to the West and a comeback to Islamic values present in the notions of
the  Young Ottomans got  their  fullest  expression in  the  Islamic  modernism of  Jamal  al-Din al-
Afghani and his pupil Muhammad ʿAbduh. To the Western accusations that Islam is not compatible
with modernity, they responded saying that Islam in its pure form is completely compatible with
modern life.91 Unlike the conservatives such as Tahtawi, they admitted that Islam of their day was in
a regretful stage. But they still held opinion that Islam in its essence is superior. The reason for the
desperate situation of Islam of their age was because the Muslims have departed from the right path
of the original religion. And while the Muslims declined, the Europeans have been learning from
the knowledge of the East which passed to them through Muslim Spain. By this explanation, the
western progress was actually of Muslim origin. The remedy was to purify the primitive Islam of
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the early days and adopt the elements of modernity. By that, the East should regain its glory.92 Both
Afghani and ʿAbduh were advocates of the Ottoman state as a sole protector of the Islamic Umma,
therefore, they were Ottomanists and in contrast to the conservatives, Ottomanist modernists.
In what ʿAbduh differed from Afghani a little bit was his slightly bigger stress on the role of
Arabs when he spoke of early Islam. For him, only those who speak Arabic propperly are capable of
understanding the Qoran and therefore a revival of Arabic studies is needed. Both Afghani and
ʿAbduh were advocates of the concept of a unified Islamic Umma at the expense of a nation state.93
However, they planted the seeds of Arabism that would gradually start creating a gap between the
Arabs and their fellow Muslim believers, the Turks.
A person who took this polemic a step further was ʿAbduh’s Syrian follower Rashid Rida.
He accused the Turks of the responsibility of the decline of Islam and criticized the Muslim Arab
caliphs who introduced Turkish mercenaries “enabling them to spoil the Umma”. In this statement
and in one another saying: “they (the Arabs) are indeed the best Umma”94 is a clear change in the
meaning of the term Umma in his use. Traditionally, it meant the population of all Muslims, yet it
seems that Rida suggested that only Muslim Arabs are part of the Umma. He goes on to state, that
the Muslim unity was achieved by Arabs and can not be achieved by no one other than them.
Therefore, to revive the Arabs is working for the Islamic union.95
Despite all that, Rashid Rida did not support Arab separatist movements until the Young
Turk revolution in 1908. Only after their centralizing and pro-Turkish policies became clear, he
became an advocate of Arabism and joined Arab separatist societies. 96
To take the case of Arabs into advocating an autonomous political unit was left for another
Syrian thinker,  Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.  He claimed,  that  with the respect  of  the Ottoman
Empire every nation should have its administrative autonomy. He took the glorification of Arabs as
the best Muslims, to the glorification of the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula as the best of Arabs,
because they were the closest to the original Muslims and were not polluted by the contact with the
West. Because of this, a caliphate in Mecca should be established, with an Arab of the tribe of
Quraysh  as  caliph.97 This  caliphate  however  was  not  to  be  a  political,  but  rather  a  spiritual
institution. Some sort of an Islamic papacy, that creates a pan-Islamic federation.98 This was the first
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clear idea of secular department of the political power from the spiritual which was not present in
the Islamic political thought before.
Rashid Rida and al-Kawakibi can be regarded as modernists, whose Arabism outraged their
Ottomanism. We can see how the treatment of decline of the Islamic lands led to two streams of
thought: conservatism and modernism. Both refused the idea that Islamic culture is inferior to the
West,  but  while  the  conservatives  repelled  the  idea  of  inferiority  in  general,  the  modernists
explained the decline by the depart of the way of pure Islam. Some of the Arab modernists in their
search  for  the  remedy of  the  decline  of  the  Eastern  and Muslim society found  the  answer  in
Arabism.  As  a  result,  Arab  nationalism  grew  out  of  Arabist  modernism,  which  grew  out  of
Ottomanist modernism.99
99  Dawn, From Arabism to Ottomanism, 140.
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2.5. The Second Generation of Thinkers: The Christian Response
The role of Christian Arabs in the formation of a nationalist self-view was emphasized in
earlier works on Arab nationalism, mainly in George Antionius’s book The Arab Awakening from
1938. Opinions on the degree of their influence vary from scholar to another. Hourani claims that
the Christians of the Middle East, unlike their Muslim neighbours did not have those ideological
difficulties with accepting ideas of the infidel West, and therefore were the first to adopt western
ideas of nationalism and echo them in the Arab world.100 But Hourani himself admits also that this
Christian movement did not have a major impact on the course of Arab nationalism, mainly because
it did not find followers among the Muslim population.101 Ernest Dawn is an advocate who claims
that the ideas of Arabism emerged in the works of Muslim Arab thinkers adopting western terms of
patriotism to the Eastern conditions and in their search for the remedy of the Muslim world inclined
to Arabism. Therefore, Dawn rejects the influence of Christians on the Arab nationalist self-view as
a key factor. In fact, many Arab Christians like Butrus al-Bustani, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq and Adib
Ishaq, istead of showing signs of sympathy to the West, shared the ideas of Islamic modernism in
defending the Eastern culture against the patronizing arogance of the West.102
The Christian Arabs however, played a key role in the Arab literary Renaissance (Nahda) in
the 19th century. This movement consisted of reviving the language, literature, history and arts of
the Arab civilization, which entered a dark age and a period of stagnation since the 16 th century.103
These efforts laid the foundations of some coordinates with which, later on, national identity could
be associated forming an idea of what a modern Arab nation is. These scholars were aware of their
belonging to a specific Arab ethnic group and were devoted to the study and revival of its culture. It
would be an ahistorical statement to claim that these scholars of the Nahda period spent their energy
intentionaly preparing for a national movement or wanted it to have any political consequences.  If
we use Hroch's classification from the first chapter,  we can classify these efforts of mostly private
individual patriots, who studied the history and culture of their ethnic group, into the phase A of the
formation of a modern nation. They undertook these efforts with the passion of enlightened scholars
for their subject of study, and without political intentions set grounds for the next steps of the nation
building process.104
Despite  the  fact  that  this  intellectual  contribution of  the  Christian Arabs  was mainly of
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literaly and cultural character, or politically consonant with the general ideas of Islamic modernism,
there were exceptions. Ibrahim al-Yaziji, one of these Syrian Christians came to call for an Arab
political independence and the overthrown of the Ottoman rule. His ideas were western secular
nationalist  that  called  for  a  political  unity for  the  Arabs,  Christian  and Muslim alike,  and the
overthrown of the Turks.105 For this purpose, in 1875 al-Yaziji founded with some other Christian
colleges a secret society in Beirut. But after all, the society was dissolved in 1882-1883, after the
approaches that were made towards the Muslims echoed no interest.106
In this period of time, al-Afghani was spreading his ideas of Islamic unity and Muhammad
ʿAbduh ideas of Islamic modernism. Thus, such ideas of separatism were rare and the Muslims
were  not  prepared  yet  to  get  rid  of  religion  as  the  main  social  and political  bond in  favor  of
nationality.  Apparently,  al-Yaziji's  Christian  Arabism  was  an  addaption  of  Western  secular
nationalism which was acceptable for some Christians, but we can see how these ideas were refused
by the Muslim majority and had no real influence on their evolution of thought.107
The Christian Arab movement will only be later used by scholars on Arab nationalism and
Arab nationalists as George Antonius, to date the beginning of Arab nationalism much earlier than
is its historical evidence. Such tendency, as Gellner says, is very frequent among early writers on
nationalism, who have the uneasy feeling from the absence of nationalism in history, especially in
regard of their own nation. Therefore, they attribute this absence to the sleep of the national feeling
and try to locate the earliest, often historically incorrect, significations of its awakening.108 
 The ideology that influenced and led to the emergence on Arab nationalism was Arabism,
which evolved from the defense of Islamic and Eastern culture against the dominance of the West.
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3. Arab Nationalism
3.1. Arab Identity and the Objective Features of the Arab National Consciousness
The Arab world today is a geographical region of various Arab states spreading from Iraq in
the east to Morocco in the west. Despite the attempts to politically unify it in modern history, it
remains more cultural than a political bond. The idea of belonging to an Arab nation was accepted
by the majority of the population only since the half of the 20th century.109 In the 19th  century, such
feelings were shared only by a part of the intellectual elite and even among them including only
Arabs of Asia.110
In the Arab world, this identification is overlapped by many other identities that are not
mutually exclusive and create what Anthony Smith describes as "the multiple identities".111 An Arab
can identify himself either regionally as a Syrian or Damascene, or with his family and tribe, or
religiously as a Christian, Muslim, Shiʿi or Sunni.
On the  other  hand,  certain  types  of  Arab identity  existed  in  various  extents  throughout
history at least since the 7th century. The Umayyad, Abbasid and Fatimid empires represented an
example of a prosperous Arab civilization, whose capitals became a memory of its glory in the later
centuries. However, since the 10th century Arabs began to lose their dominant position in favor of
other Muslim ethnicities and gradually became ruled by them. In the 16th century, most of the Arab
lands came under the rule of the Ottomans, although the Arab language (the language of the Koran
and Islam) persisted as the official language of religion in the Arab provinces throughout the whole
period of Ottoman rule.
Consequently,  language  and   history  are  two  features  that  influence  a  nation  building
process.  As a result, the significance of these features is proven by every theory on the emergence
of nationalism and modern nations. Language was typically an objective characteristic in defining
the nation. Among other objective characteristics, such as cultural and territorial ties, it was in the
central attention of primordial theories of nationalism. In the case of Arabic language, it never went
extinct as an official language of Islam in the Arab provinces and therefore there was no need to
codify it as in the case of some East European languages. Similar to the German model, the Arabs
had a large body of high culture and literature written in their language with the Koran having a
central  position  in  it.  Yet,  Arab  literature  witnessed  a  stagnation  since  the  16 th century.  The
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importance of language for early stages  of an Arab movement are demonstrated in the literary
renaissance (Nahda) of the 19th century. The study of the grammar and the revival of the literature
was undertaken and also the language was modernized to be more compatible with the needs of the
modern age.
The past or the ties with the history that influence the development of pre-modern ethnic and
political relations are stressed as a key factor in the formation of nations by the advocates of the
perennial approach. This is a term introduced by Anthony Smith to distinguish those who deduce
nations  from  their  historical  development  from  those  who  define  nations  by  their  objective
characteristics.112 The Arab past,  in  the sense of  past  Arab glory,  unlike the language,  was not
directly connected with the reality of the 19th century, neither was it present in it when the Arabs
were ruled by the Ottomans. The significance of the past and the effort to connect with its glory can
be indicated in the work of Jurji Zaydan. His contribution to the literary Nahda was raising the
awareness of the Arab past in his popular historical novels.113
It is clear that language and history consist a predisposition of the formation of any modern
nation, and have a central role in the primordial and perennial approaches to nationalism. However,
in the modernist theories, which this work is based on, the nation building process is explained by
the process of modernization, participation of its members, social and economic circumstances and
conflict of interests.114 These features will be determined in the following pages and in order to do
so it is inevitable to look at the period which preceded WWI.
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3.2. Ottomanism, Arabism and Arab Nationalism
To define Arab nationalism, it is crucial to distinguish it from its predecessor – the ideology
of Arabism. The term Arabism was first used by Ernest Dawn. Rashid Khalidi, his colleague and
critic defines it  as follows: it  stresses Arab elements at  the expense of other (Islamic, regional)
elements.115 In terms of Anthony Smith’s vocabulary, this ideology should be classified as national
identification.116 As it lacks political or territorial significations, it can not be considered an ideology
of nationalism.
The  absence  of  political  signification  is  the  main  difference  between  Arabism and  the
ideology of Ottomanism. From the name of Dawn’s book From Ottomanism to Arabism one might
assume that these are two competing ideologies of the same type that have two different centers of
loyalty. In fact, these are two ideologies that do not contradict each other directly. (In the end, they
derive from two words, which are from different spheres. Arab means ethnicity, a kind of people.
Ottoman is the name of a dynasty and the state it rules.) While Ottomanism is an ideology with
political signification, Arabism is not. An Ottomanist seeks to create one Ottoman nationality or
citizenship  shared  by all  the  inhabitants  of  the  political  unit  of  the  empire.  This  nationality is
superior to various identifications with ethnic groups within the empire. An Arabist raises the Arabs
to  a  position  of  pre-eminence,  who  live  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  next  to  the  Turks  and  other
nationalities. Both of them want the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Arabism as an ideology
may demand some sort of autonomy or preservation of the Arab language and habits in the Arab
provinces. But generally it is a cultural ideology, which is in political harmony with Ottomanism-
the case of most of the Arabists before 1914. This approach basically is what distinguishes them
from  a  minority  movement  of  Arab  nationalists,  who  advocated  separation  from  the  empire.
Approximately around these years, the situation started to change.117
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3.3. The Arabs and the Young Turks
During the rule of Abdulhamid II, the Arab provinces in Great Syria witnessed a series of
modernizing  reforms.  Infrastructure  and  communication  means  were  upgraded,  agricultural
production and trade were expanding and modern educational system, including primary, technical,
and military schools, was established. All this took place during an era of political stability. After
losing more and more territory in Europe, the sultan's focus shifted to the Islamic element of the
empire and started successfully leaning on Arabs as representatives in the Arab provinces. Some of
these  notables  made it  to  his  close circle  of  advisers  in  Istanbul.  By doing so,  Abdulhamid II
secured  the  loyalty  of  the  landowning-bureaucrat  class  in  Syria,  who  then  profited  from their
positions and modernizing reforms and identified themselves with the ideology of Ottomanism.118
Nevertheless, Abdulhamid II’s regime had opponents, who were stronger outside Damascus
in coastal cities such as Beirut and came from two sources.  The first  were the Christians who
viewed Abdulhamid II’s pan-Islamic policy as threatening to their equality and new acquired rights
from the Tanzimat period. The second were Muslims engaged in trade, who saw that Abdulhamid
II’s policy did not protect them from the European commercial competition.
In Damascus, the opposition was much weaker because the Christian population was smaller
and  the  Muslim notables  were  much  more  connected  with  the  state  system than  their  Beiruti
counterparts. The opposition here had two sources as well. The first were the conservative religious
circles who had support among the religious population, but were in the long term losing the fight
with modernism, centralization and the rise of the secularized political elite. The second seem to
come from, either the secular or religious notables, who were not in favor of the regime and lost
their positions in the system.119
The secular opposition during the Hamidian period usually joined the ranks of the Turkish
reformist constitutional movement of the Young Turks and their political umbrella- the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP).120 The Young Turks represented a liberal intellectual opposition to
the  autocracy of  Abdulhamid  II,  emerging  in  Istanbul  and  built  on  the  heritage  of  the  Young
Ottomans.  Its  adherents  came from distinct  ethnic  and  ideological  backgrounds  throughout  the
empire united by their  resistance to Abdulhamid II,  demands for freedom of expression,  ethnic
equality and restoration of the constitution from 1876.121
Hanioğlu claims that the CUP attitude towards the Arabs can be summarized in regarding
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them as inferior to the Turks and that any Arab demands for cultural autonomy is paramount to
separatist activities.122 Despite that, the CUP did collaborate with many Arabs who they considered
representing a purely Ottomanist course of opposition to Abdulhamid II. The examples of these
were  Emir  Arslan  and  Khalil  Ghanem,  the  founders  of  the  Turkish-Syrian  Committee,  which
merged into the CUP in 1897.123
During the years 1895-1897 the CUP was even able to establish an influential branch in
Syria  and  gain  support  from  some  of  the  ulama,  the  Qadiriyah  sufi  sect,  some  members  of
prominent families like Rafiq al-Azm and officers of the 5th Ottoman army based in Syria. The CUP
was attempting a coup there,  but  the central  government  was able to  uncover  members  of  the
movement, crack down and dismantle the organization. After this incident the CUP lost its hold in
Syria and the Arabs did not participate in the movement in such numbers in the years to come.124
Even during the years of 1895-1897, the majority the of Syrian population was loyal to the leading
families, whose majority remained loyal to the Sultan.
In regards  to  the events  of  the Young Turk revolution  in  1908 and the reactions  which
followed in  the  Arab provinces,  the  academic  community remains  rather  fragmented.  The first
generation of George Antonius, as well as the scholars of the 1950s and 1960s such as Zeine, assert
that the revolution was met with enthusiasm. For many Arabs, the restoration of the constitution and
the reopening of the parliament meant that they could make their voice heard in the capital and
improve their position in the empire.125
On the other hand, younger scholars propose a different picture of the events. They say that
the majority of the Syrian population and the elite were content with the prosperity and tranquility
of the Hamidian era and that they were not enthusiastic when the news of the CUP seizing power
arrived. The demonstrations erupting in Damascus supporting the CUP were drummed up by CUP
adherents to show their  affiliation with the coup. However,  the ruling class was worried about
political stability and about their positions, which they could lose now in the open competition of
elections.126
The one thing that all the scholars agree on regarding these events is that at this point the
policy of the CUP came across as Ottomanist reformist to the vast public. While Dawn holds the
opinion that its policy remained this way until 1918127, Hanioglu disagrees, saying that while the
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CUP was formally Ottomanist, the inner circle of its leaders was strongly inclined towards Turkish
nationalist policy already before 1908. Neither the public, nor even the Arab members of the CUP
were aware of that, which is why some of them supported the movement or were even part of it.128
The controversy in the opinions of Dawn and Hanioglu on the CUP's ideological character can be
perhaps explained by an inner contradiction of two wings in side the party itself: one Ottomanist
liberal and the other more Turkish nationalist. The latter was more dominant in the party’s decision-
making already from before the revolution and its  hold became even stronger in the following
years.129
Almost immediately after the coup in 1908, the center of Arab political activity had shifted
to Istanbul. On 9.8.1908, the first Arab society was created there under the name  The Society of
Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood. Its policy was purely Ottomanist and upon its opening it was attended
and celebrated by the Arab founders and the CUP leaders. Its founders consisted mainly of Arab
representatives of the old Hamidian regime, who were trying to secure their status and positions of
representatives of the Arab interests in the government.130
A blow to  the  Arab-Ottoman cause was delivered  after  the  results  of  the  parliamentary
elections were announced. The Arabs gained only 60 seats out of the total number of 275 and the
Turks obtained 142 seats. At this time, the population of the Arabs was outnumbering the Turkish
population in the empire by a ratio of 10,5 million to 7,5 million.131 The majority of the Syrian
delegates were notables, who the CUP managed to get as their nominees in exchange for positions
in the government. A minority were delegates from Damascus who were opposing the Unionists in
the parliament, but could not unite in one effective bloc.132
In April 1909 the 1st army, with backing from the religious circles, tried to make a counter-
coup against the CUP but were unsuccessful. After this attempt, the CUP deposed Abdulhamid II
replacing him with a more submissive sultan and launched a series of governmental cleansings that
were aimed at the members of the old regime, replacing them by loyal CUP members. Abdulhamid
II’s advisers, of whom many were Arabs, and local governors in Syria were replaced by loyal CUP
members, who were almost entirely Turks.133
The scholars who claimed that the 1908 revolution was met with cheering in Syria say that
after the incidents of depositions and elections to the Ottoman parliament, the Arabs realized that
CUP intentions did not mean equality with the Turks and abandoned the short-lived illusions.134
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Scholars such as Khalidi and Khoury,  who maintained that the majority of the Syrian notables,
especially those from Damascus,  were opposing the CUP, explain that these notables now became
alienated even more by the new regime and started to feel that the CUP policy was disrupting their
balance of power. Some of the Arab members of the CUP even left the party after its intention
became more obvious.135
Despite all that, the opposition which was mounting against the CUP all took form within
the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and Ottomanist ideology. This resistance was against a ruling
group (CUP) with a demand to replace it by another ruling group so that the local authorities can
regain their power. This opposition did not have separatist desires. The strategy it used against the
CUP did not have a nationalist undertone, rather it blamed the CUP in the traditional Islamic terms
of  being  impious  usurpers  of  power.  The  Arab  opposition  to  the  government  was  more  an
opposition  to  the  centralization  of  the  CUP,  than  the  ideology  of  Turkish  nationalism  or
Turkification.136
The impact of the CUP policy that was mostly felt among the population was perhaps the
Turkification of schools, the court system and the local administration. Suddenly, children had to
learn the new language for the first time, and merchants and traders had to communicate in court or
with the administration in a foreign language or through a translator. These manners helped the
liberal-secular opposition in gaining support and the political resistance started the switch towards
Arabism as a defense against the CUP centralizing Turkification.137
Nevertheless,  there  is  discrepancy on this  fact  as  well.  Dawn and  Kayalı  state,  that  the
Young Turks  were charged with Turkification, but were not guilty of it as it is believed. They
claim, that Turkish had been the official language of the administration since 1876 and was used in
courts  with translators to Arabic.  In the education system as well,  Turkish was the language of
instruction from the upper primary school level and above, with Arabic as the local language being
taught as well.138
Ironically, what helped the Arab opposition the most was the press, which was for years
censored under Abdulhamid II, and the CUP lifted this censorship after they came to power. The
Arab newspapers of this period were the main promoter of Arabism to the general literate public.
Muhammad Kurd Ali, a former CUP supporter and journalist started to publish Al-Muqtabas. This
journal was oriented towards promoting the idea of Arabism as a key component of Ottomanism of
the Hamidian era. A more radical paper was published in Istanbul by Shukri Al-Asali under the
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name Qabas. This journal asked for more political autonomy for the Arab territories. Despite the
fact that  the press censorship was lifted, after the 1909 counter-coup the CUP was not willing to
risk too much freedom of opinion and occasionally some journals were  closed and suppressed.139
Another blow to the idea of Turkish-Arab unity was the ban of societies established by non-
Turkish ethnic groups, which led to the abolishment of the Society of Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood
only eight months after it was inaugurated at an impassioned meeting of Arabs and Turks.140
After this incident, the Arab opposition had to move their activities into a form of secret and
semi-secret  organizations.  In Istanbul,  the Literary Club was opened that  overtook most  of the
Brotherhood Society’s members and was unofficially a cover for various political activities and
discussions.  The  club  was  tolerated  by  the  Unionists,  because  its  activities  were  not  mainly
political. It was not a policy-making organization, rather a platform, where many politically-active
Arabists  would meet,  and through this  platform their  ideas gained new supporters.  Most  of  its
members were Arab students in Istanbul, and later the club opened branches in Syria and Iraq.141
Towards the end of 1909 a secret society, formed by some army officers who were members
of  the  Literary  Club,  was  established  under  the  name  Qahtaniya. The  political  aims  of  this
organization  were  to  establish  a  dual  monarchy  based  on  the  model  of  the  Austro-Hungarian
Empire, with the Ottoman sultan being the person connecting the Arab and Turkish Empires. The
Arabs would have their own parliament with Arabic as the official language.142
Despite  the fact that  the activities of most  of the Arab organizations and societies were
focused on obtaining some degree of autonomy and decentralization within the empire, there were
some who had secession already in mind. In November 1909, a group of Muslim students and
members of the Literary Club established the Young Arab Society which was the first organization
to  demand  complete  separation  from  the  empire  and  played  a  key  role  in  the  Arab  national
movement.143 The organization and its communications were secret and some of its members were
executed during WWI. Those who survived, played an important role in Arab politics after the
war.144
Since the revolution of 1908 until 1912, two trends were struggling in the CUP policy: The
Ottomanist liberal and the Turkish nationalist trend. It is difficult to judge, how sincere were the
promises of equality made by the CUP when they came to power. We can only ask, what could be
the actions of the CUP if the conditions in which they were, were different. The Young Turks came
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to power in a very difficult time and were immediately exposed to serious internal and external
threats, which put them in a mood of anger and frustration. It is undisputed, that the events in the
Balkan, that followed the 1908 coup, were viewed by the Turks as betrayal.  Austria seizing an
opportunity annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared its independence and Crete united
with Greece.145 The Christians rejected the idea of Ottoman liberalism and shared citizenship and
indicated  how the  multicultural  model  was  inapplicable  in  the  Ottoman Empire.  However,  the
situation in the Arab lands, as proved by many previous sources above, was very different. The
Arabs, unlike the Balkan Christians, were loyal to the empire and wished its continuation. Despite
that, it seems that the CUP was unable to apply a different measure on the Arabs and treated them
based on the events of the Balkan.
The CUP could not reconcile between two contradicting ideologies:  Turkish nationalism
(and the rising Pan-Turanian ideology)  and Ottomanism.  It  tried to  merge the  two together  by
promoting the Turks above the other races and keep the Ottoman leadership of the Muslim umma in
the same time. The CUP in the Arab lands failed to recognize demands for decentralization from
separatism and by doing so,  they imposed centralization and tightened the autonomy,  where it
needed decentralization and relaxation.
In  addition  to  that,  there  were  the  internal  threats,  that  were  demonstrated  in  the  1909
counter coup. The CUP had to seize power and in order to do so, they basically gave up the ideas of
constitutional equality and liberty.
In  1912-1913,  the  CUP’s  grip  on  power  was  weakened,  which  allowed the  Arabists  to
advance. In the end of 1911, various opposition groups to the CUP, which emerged within the party
itself, merged into one political party called the Liberal Union. Because its members were already
in the parliament, it could start to oppose the CUP right away and propose a plan of decentralization
of the Ottoman Empire.146
The CUP’s immediate response was securing the dissolution of the parliament and arranging
the new elections, in which of 275 delegates only 6 opposition deputies were able to gain seats in
the chamber. In this elections, all the existing Arab opposition from the 1908 parliament lost their
seats except of two, who allied with the CUP in the campaign and entered the parliement on their
ticket.147 In 1913, when the government was busy with the Balkan War the CUP launched another
attack, this time on the cabinet, shooting the minister of war Nazim Pasha dead and forcing the
opposition Kamil Pasha to resign from the post of the president of the Council of State.148 By these
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steps the CUP secured the position of sole governors that lasted until the end of WWI.
Under these circumstances and with connection to the Liberal Union, the Ottoman Party of
Administrative  Decentralization  was  formed  in  December  1912  in  Cairo.  It  was  founded  by  
Syrians living in exile in Egypt and was headed by Rafiq Bey al-Azm from Damascus. After the
1912 elections, many of the defeated Arab deputies joined the party as (Shurki al-ʿAsali, Shafiq
Muʾayyad al-ʿAzm, Rusdi al-Samʿa and ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi).149 The party’s demands were
similar  to  earlier  decentralization  movements,  particularly  to  recognize  Arabic  as  the  official
language, to secure a greater decentralization in the provinces and grant a wider participation of
Arabs in the government. This Party had close contacts with all the major societies in Syria and Iraq
and the Literary Club in Istanbul. It became the first fully organized body of Arab opposition to the
CUP.
The  Decentralization  Party  enjoyed  support  among  the  Syrian  elite,  but  some  of  the
Damascene families started to oppose the organization. These were mainly the families, who by
collaborating  with  the  CUP  managed  to  regain  their  local  positions.  They  charged  the
Decentralization  Party  of  collaborating  with  the  European  powers  and  therefore  betraying  the
empire.  These  charges  were  actually  not  pure  fabrication,  as  some  leaders  of  the  party  were
considering the idea of British protection against the French interests in the Syrian region, in case
that the Ottoman Empire collapses and the British were supportive of that.150 However, this split of
opinions  among  the  Arab  notables  of  Damascus  was  increasingly  reflecting  their  inner  power
struggle, which was manifested by holding the side of either the CUP Ottomanist or the anti-CUP
Arabist stream.
Following the fall of Kamil Pasha’s government in Istanbul, the CUP in April 1913 closed
the  Syrian  branches  of  the  Decentralization  Party.  The  Beirut  Reform  Society,  an  influential
organization in the province, formed just three months ago with demands raging from those similar
to the Decentralization party to demanding political independence for the Beirut Province under the
protection of France.151 After these repressive steps, al-Fatat (the Young Arab Society) took the role
of secret operations and promotion of revolt in the Syrian provinces. The center of political activity
had to switch to a neutral ground and from the initiative of the Young Arabs, the first Arab Congress
was assembled in Paris.
The congress met on 18.-23. 7. 1913 and was attended by 24 delegates, of which two were
from Iraq, three represented the Arab community in USA, the rest were from the Syrian provinces
and  all  of  them  were  almost  equally  represented  by  Muslims  and  Christians.  The  articulated
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resolutions  were  in  favor  of  westernizing  reforms  to  modernize  the  Arab  lands  and  asked for
decentralization within the empire.152 The CUP, who tried to prevent the congress from taking place,
was now willing to negotiate with its members and sent a representative to draw an argument with
them. The drafted agreement, reached in Paris, granted using Arabic as an official language and in
education in  the primary and secondary schools,  restrictions on military service and granting a
stable number of Arab deputies in the parliament and as local governors. The negotiations followed
for two months, when the CUP confident after a major victory in the Balkan, presented the Arab
Congress with a reform program lacking most of the points agreed on. The Arab reaction to this was
shock and despair.153
The last organization formed before the eruption of the war which deserves mentioning, was
the secret society of military officers  al-ʿAhd (The Promise). It was formed on the principles of
Qahtaniya by the same leader ʿAziz ʿAli al-Misri after they had to dissolve the former organization,
because of the suspicion that they had a spy among them. Al-ʿAhd was preparing an uprising in the
Arab provinces  which  was  however  uncovered  by the  authorities  and al-Misri  was  arrested  in
February 1914, sentenced to death, but after demonstrations in Egypt and the pressure of UK in
Istanbul, was released and returned to Egypt.154
By the outbreak of WWI, the CUP had been successfully dividing the Arab opposition into
the rival Ottomanist and Arabist camps. It succeeded also in gaining the support of some of the
prominent Arabists by offering them positions in the local government or in the parliament, among
them the influential president of the Arab Congress ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi. The Arab movement
was by the beginning of war starting to get oriented on separation from the empire, but it was
unsuccessful to achieve a popular upheaval among the wast population and remained an issue that
affected only the upper narrow layer of society.155
According to M. Hroch’s periodization, phase A of the nation building process was already
identified as the period of Arab literary Nahda. The national movement in its essence begins with
phase B, when some part of the ethnic group, usually the more educated, starts to promote the new
national  identity  to  the  rest  of  the  ethnic  group.  In  the  beginning  of  phase  B,  is  the  national
movement an issue of a limited circle of nationalists, but its goal is to gain support of the wide
public and the masses. The stage of mobilization is the success of phase B, and it is what it takes the
national movement to phase C.156 The Arab movement, as it was shown, did not succeed to become
a mass movement by 1914, nor until the end of the war in 1918. Based on that, it can be summed
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up, that the Arab movement reached phase B only in the studied period. 
Following the model periodization of Hroch, phase C should follow after phase B with the
mobilization of the masses by the idea of gaining independence and self governance, Here is where
the path of the Arab national movement differs from the model situation. In 1919, for a short period
of time, Syria gained independence and its elected political bodies acquired the ideology of Arab
nationalism from the very beginning. This political unit  officially represented only Syria, but it
spoke of Syrians as the members of on Arab nation.157 Therefore, it can be said that, by a historical
coincidence,  gaining  independence  predated  the  mass  mobilization  for  that  goal,  and  the  Arab
national movement did not have a phase C. The goal of phase C, the mobilization of the crowds,
was left for the nationalist government and thus it is possible to say, that after the state was created
it had to create the Arabs. 
157 Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 152.
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3.4. The social aspects of Arabism and the Subjective Features of the Arab Nation 
Building Process
The primordial aspects of the Arab nation building process (ties with the past, language and
ethnicity)  were already been discussed.  Now it  is  time to  specify some of  the features,  which
according to the modernist theorists of nationalism, most greatly impact it.158 According to Gellner’s
theory, nationalism occurs as an accompaniment as well as the result of several social changes in
the modern world. More specifically, these changes are particularly the extinction of the old social
system (the feudal system in Europe) and the emergence of the middle class.159
These social changes were seen in the Arab World in particular, in the Middle East as a
whole, starting in the second half of the 19th century- specifically in the modernized administration,
faster communications and mass education, which resulted in the formation of new professional
occupations. Governmental clerks, teachers in modern state schools, journalists and army officers
were all a new class, which Gellner would characterize as versed in high culture and context-free
communication.160 This class formed the ranks of both Ottomanists and Arabists, and their common
denominator was the opposition to the ruling class, which had been unsuccessful in protecting the
Islamic civilization against the European expansion.
Besides the emergence of this new class, Gellner ascribes the emergence of nationalism to
the loss of the bond or glue that used to hold the social relations together in the pre-modern age. The
bond of Islam, as the cornerstone of social and political life in the Islamic World, was weakened, if
not socially then at least politically after the intellectual crisis of the 19th century. The simple but
revolutionary idea, that Islam does not contain in itself all the solutions needed nor the remedy for
the deplorable stage of the Islamic World, opened the field for other rival ideologies to compete for
its place, namely to nationalism in both its forms (cultural and political). This inability to solve the
chief problem of the Eastern world, which was the pain of humiliation and defeat in the face of the
West, was always the driving force of all the rival ideologies and their reasons in overtaking the
former ideology’s  place.  And so,  since no ideology or no system has been able to resolve this
problem to this day, the substitution of ideologies, where the latter is overtaking the place of the
former, is a continuous and repeating process. As in the 19th century, the Islamic modernism of
Muhammad  ʿAbduh and the Ottomanist conservatism of the tanzimat  period did not achieve the
promised results, so Ottomanist modernism claimed the field. When Ottomanist modernism failed,
Arabism and Arab nationalism challenged it in the same way. Finally, when looking past the era
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currently in discussion, Arab nationalism was eventually defeated in 1967 and was challenged by
Islamic political ideologies yet again.
Returning to  the period Arabist and Ottomanist conflict, both ideologies claimed that they
contain the solution for restoring Islamic greatness. The aims of Arabism did not differ radically
from those of Ottomanism. Most of the Arabists before 1914 did not advocate separation from the
empire and their main difference from the Ottomanists was in the means of how to manage the
Ottoman empire in order to regain its glory and resist the penetration of the West. The reasons why
some Arabs switched to  Arabism, that  was a lesser bond in comparison to  Ottomanism, might
perhaps have had two causes.
The first might have been that for many Arabs, Ottomanism could have seemed unable in
achieving its goal of closing the gap between Islam and the West.161 Secondly, when the Young
Turks, as representatives of Ottomanism decided to consolidate power in Istanbul, they prevented
the Arabs from participating on the creation of the policy of an ideology that claimed to include
them.162
Nevertheless, Arabism remained a minority movement among the Arabs even between 1908-
1914, as it is believed by the latest generation of scholars, mainly Dawn, but also including Khalidi
and Khoury. The problem of such a conclusion is that it seems to contradict several examples of
primary evidence: 1) The quantity of Arabist material in the press from 1908-1914 significantly
outnumbered the Ottomanist material, 2)Diplomatic documents of European diplomats from Syria
speak of the growing importance of the national feeling among the Arabs, and 3) The experience
and works of those, who participated in the movement before 1914.163
Based on these sources of evidence,  until  the 1950s and 1960s it  was believed that  the
ideology of Arabism was dominant in Syria in 1908-1914. However, as revealed by Dawn, the
sources that supported this theory can be missleading. Firstly,the press does not necessarily reflect
the reality; rather it reflects the ideas of its writers.164 Naturally, the Arabist journals outnumbered
the Ottomanist ones, because they were the means by which the Arabists wanted to spread their
ideology and gain support. Ottomanism as a dominant ideology did not need to justify itself and
most of its adherents held governmental office,  which they could use to channel their ideology
instead of using the press. However, even if the press did not reflect what people were thinking, at
the very least it was what the public had been reading for most of those six years. Therefore, the
concept of Arabism, even if not supported by many, was very familiar among the Syrian elite.
In terms of the diplomatic documents, instead of reflecting the reality, they might have been
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a reflection of the European intentions, which often aimed to undermine the loyalty to the Sultan
and the Caliphate. The Europeans also tended to see the events in the Middle East and the Third
world from only a European perspective, where since the beginning of the 20 th century nationalism
was by far the leading political ideology.
The experience of the early Arab writers,  who were participants in the movement as well,on
the Arab Nationalism was probably affected by its spread and success after 1918, and as previously
mentioned,  nationalists  generally tended to see the  emergence of  the  national  movement  much
earlier then it became a reality.165
Probably the main evidence that Arabism was a minority movement among the Arab elite
until 1914, is that it did not achieve any major success neither before nor during the war. Even the
Arab Revolt in 1916 was a separate movement and had only few Syrian Arabist participants. It was
more of a personal revolt of the Hashimite Sharif of Mecca against the Ottoman rule, which did not
adopt the ideology of Arabism from the beginning, and only finally did in order to attract the Arab
opposition to the CUP in Syria. It can be also assumed, that the Arab Revolt facilitated the Arab
movement more than the movement facilitated the revolt.166
However,  the  important  question  is  not  whether  Arabism  was  or  was  not  a  minority
movement, but rather what were the reasons that made some of the Arabs choose Arabism on the
expense of Ottomanism, since it had claimed to be serving the same purpose as Arabism. Ernest
Dawn has done the most extensive research so far in order to answer this question by identifying
members  of  the  Arab  movement  and  comparing  their  bibliographical  data  with  that  of  their
Ottomanist counterparts.
In his study, Ernest Dawn dealt with Damascus and the surrounding areas, arguing that the
Arab movement in Syria was representative of the Arab movement as a whole, and Damascene
participants constituted a large percentage of all its participants. The movement in Syria, unlike
other regions, went through all the steps leading to its fulfillment after the war in the form of a
formally elected body: the government and the Syrian General Congress. Another reason Dawn
chose  Damascus  for  this  study  was  the  higher  availability  of  bibliographical  data  about  the
inhabitants from this period.167 What does not speak in favor of the choice of Damascus as Dawn’s
sample of  the Arab movement,  is  Khalidi’s  argument that  in  the coastal  areas of Lebanon and
Palestine, a new middle class much more developed than in Damascus was on the rise due to the
trade activities  in  the port  cities.  This  new middle class  had a greater  tendency to  acquire  the
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ideology of Arabism. This region, being open to the sea, was also open to new influences and ideas
that came along with the trade, and also benefited from being more religiously mixed then the
landlocked regions. As a result, the coastal cities were more likely to accept new ideologies than the
conservative cities such as Damascus.168
 Dawn’s method of analysis was to identify the active Syrian Arabists from the period 1908-
1914 and to compare their bibliographical data such as education, occupation, age, position in the
social  hierarchy  and  the  relationship  to  local  administration  with  the  Syrian  Ottomanists.  He
assumed, that the Arabists were either those, who publicly advocated Arabism, or were members of
at  least  one  of  the  known  Arab  societies  or  organizations  in  that  period.  According  to  these
parameters, he identified 126 public advocates of Arabism as well as members of three societies,
(Decentralization Party, al-Fatat, al-ʿAhd) of whom 51 were Syrians.169
There are several factors to this approach that can be critiqued. Firstly, the numbers are too
low if we take in account that Amin Saʿid claims, that 315 of 490 Arab officers in Istanbul before
1914 were members of al-ʿAhd,170 or that al-Fatat had more then 200 members, as is claimed by
Antonius.171 These numbers might be exaggerated and there are no specific given names, but it is
known that the membership in at least Qahtaniya and al-ʿAhd was secret, so it is highly possible
that the real numbers of Arabists were higher than the ones identified by Dawn. The point of this
argument, is not to state that there were more Arabists than Dawn is claiming, but to stress that the
51 identified  members  might  be  a  small  fraction  of  the  whole  movement  and therefore,  not  a
sufficient sample to rely on for analysis.
Secondly, Dawn did not include in his analysis members of the Qahtaniya, also an Arabist
organization, for unspecified reasons,. He also excluded from the research 79 Syrians, who signed a
telegram stating support to the Arab Congress in Paris, explaining that they were advocated of the
movement and not its leaders. This assumption is wrong, as the number of the delegates at the
congress was only 24, meaning many active Arabists  and members of various societies did not
attend, probably do to the prevention of the CUP or because the congress was organized in such a
short period of time. Twelve of the signatories were also members of the societies, whose members
Dawn considered to be the leaders of the movement by Dawn. Therefore, it can be argued that those
signatories, as active Syrian Arabists, are usable material for the analysis as well.
The last point of critique to be mentioned, is Dawn’s identification of the Ottomanists prior
to 1914. After the end of the war in 1918 and during the brief rule of King Faysal in Syria, Arabism
became  the  national  ideology  and  all  the  Ottomanists  adapted  it,  because  there  was  no  other
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alternative left. In the two main governmental bodies, the Syrian General Congress and the Syrian
Cabinet, the pre-1914 Arabists constituted only 15 percent. The rest were, as Dawn describes them,
the newcomers to Arab Nationalism, or post-1918 nationalists,  and he identified them as being
Ottomanists before 1914. Though it is highly probable, that most of them were Ottomanists and
CUP supporters before 1914, this has not been proven and it would not be totally correct to make
that conclusion. Especially considering that there is such a lack of the data on pre-1914 Arabists, it
is hypothetically quite possible that some of those post-1918 nationalists might have been unknown
or secret members of the Arab societies before 1914.
Nevertheless, and despite this criticism, Dawn’s research from the available data is useful in
drawing a picture of the social backgrounds of the pre-1914 Arabists. In regards to their educational
backgrounds, the often traditionally assumed notion, that the Arabists were a product of Western
education and values, has been proven incorrect. The Arabists, alike the Ottomanists, were formed
mainly by graduates of Ottoman state schools. However, the graduates of Western and traditional
schools constituted a somewhat bigger portion in the ranks of the Arabists.172 The Western and
traditionally educated groups within the Arabists reflected two intellectual trends of the movement:
one  religious  and  one  secular.  The  traditionalists,  fearing  the  Western  threat  and  the  CUP
secularization, stressed the contribution of Arabs to Islam and the negative impact of the Turkish
rule,  and advocated strengthening the Islamic institutions and traditions.  The secularists,  on the
other hand, advocated the need for a resurgence of the empire by applying Western technology and
political principles.
Concerning  age  differences,  the  Arabists  did  not  vary  in  any  marked  way  from  the
Ottomanists,  aside  from the  members  of  al-Fatat,  who were  mostly  students  in  their  twenties.
Perhaps the demands for a complete separation from the Ottoman Empire, which before 1914 were
rare, even among the Arabists, reflect both the vitality and political inexperience of its members.173
The Arabists did not differ from the Ottomanists even in the positions they occupied in the
social hierarchy. Most of Arabists and Ottomanists came from the high class families of landowners
and urban notables, and at times, one family had members among both the Arabists and Ottomanists
as well. There were slightly more Arabists among the middle class or lower upper class, which
contained new and less powerful landowners.174
The  main  difference  between  Arabists  and  Ottomanists  was  their  relation  to  the  local
government and holding office. Many of the Syrian Arabists did hold governmental office before
1908, but were unable to retain their positions after the CUP cleansings and replacements by Turks.




Others, mainly the younger generation that had the qualification and training to hold governmental
posts and were expecting to succeed their parents and family members in the bureaucracy, were
unable  to  do  so.  The  Ottomanists  were  more  successful  in  holding  governmental  office,  in
comparison to their Arabists counterparts (35% compared to 16% respectively). The distinction is
even clearer in regards to their fathers (73% in comparison to 13%respectively).175
This distinction in holding office, is reflected in the occupations of the members of the two
ideologies as well. The Ottomanists mostly occupied government positions, while the Arabists were
mostly journalists, doctors, lawyers, engineers and were often engaged in intellectual pursuits. The
main reason for this is that the Arabists had to secure a livelihood, which they could not find in the
government.
Thus the main and most important difference between Arabists and Ottomanists among the
Damascene elite was holding governmental office. This distinction was sometimes present among
members of the same family, where one branch enjoyed the favor of the government and benefited
economically, while the other did not. Such a phenomenon can be demonstrated by the al-ʿAzm
family, where Shafiq Muʾayyad al-ʿAzm, Rafiq al-ʿAzm and Haqqi al-ʿAzm were leading Arabists,
while their cousins Muhammad Fawzi al-ʿAzm and Badiʿ Beg Muʾayyad al-ʿAzm were Ottomanists
and CUP sympathizers.176 The Arabists opposed not only the outer enemy, which for them was the
CUP, but also an inner enemy or rival which were the Syrian Ottomanists.
In all the theories concerning the nation building process, especially by those scholars that
analyze  the  formation  of  nations  sociologically,  great  attention  point  towards  the  feature  of  a
conflicts of interests. The process can be manifested by the struggle of power, economical positions,
prestige, by the struggle between the center and the periphery and between different social groups
or classes.
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the global rivalry and conflict between
Ottomanism and Arabism was basically  a  reflection  of  an  inner  conflict  in  the  Syrian  society.
However,  it  was  not  a  conflict  between  various  classes  as  previously  portrayed  by  earlier
generations of writers, (though the middle class challenge for power was on the rise and might have
been more important in the coastal regions), but was rather an inner elite conflict between members
of the Syrian high class competing for power.
This struggle between the Arab Ottomanists and Arabists accompanied the course of the
Arab  political  history  during  the  second  Ottoman  constitutional  era  from 1908  to  1918,  with
Arabism being the minority movement challenging the dominant ideology of Ottomanism. All this
changed, when a “coincidence of history” brought the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and left
175 Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 16.
176 Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, 67.
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the Ottomanists with no other political alternative than to adopt the ideology of Arab nationalism.
Based on that,  it  can  be  summarized  that  Arabism,  demanding political  autonomy,  never  fully
developed into a separatist nationalist movement seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire
like  the  nationalist  movements  in  the  Balkan.  Arab  nationalism  suddenly  became  a  national
ideology of Syria in 1919 and only since then started to gain the support of the wide public and
promote its main goal, the Arab unity. 
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Conclusion
Nationalist ideas among the Arabs were not a pure imitation of the West and did not develop
from the secular nationalism of the Lebanese Christian Arabs. The ideas of this movement, after all,
echoed no interest among the Muslim majority of Arabs. 
To sum up,  the  roots  of  Arab nationalism can be  found in  Islamic  modernism and the
increasing gap between Western and Eastern civilizations. Since the beginning of the 19th century,
the ruling minority of Ottoman society was aware of the need to adopt some Western-style reforms
to keep up with the military advancement of Europe. This obvious need to imitate the West caused
an  injury to  the  Ottoman  and  Eastern  self-view.  Thinkers  such  as  al-Afghani  and  Muhammad
ʿAbduh departed from justifying the need for reforms, which was typical among their predecessors,
and  immersed  themselves  instead  in  an  emotional  defense  and  self-justification  of  Islamic
civilization. In order to ease the pain of the present humiliation and inferiority, they recalled the
glory of the Eastern past. The period that they considered to be the peak of Eastern civilization was
the period of early Islam. They believed that the return to this period would close the gap between
the two civilizations and bring a sense of superiority back to the East. And so, because Islam of the
early followers was the Islam of Arabs, reviving Islam basically meant reviving the Arabs to their
position of preeminence in the Islamic world.
Arabism as  an  ideology developed from Islamic modernism and the  difference between
these two can be pictured as follows: For an Islamic modernist, Arabs and the Arabic language play
a significant role,  because it  was via the Arabic language that Islam was revealed to them and
spread by them to the world. For an Arabist, Islam has a significant position, because it was in the
name of Islam that the Arabs conquered and ruled the world. However, for the Arabist, Islam is only
one of the components of his Arab identity. 
Before the eruption of WWI, Arabism, demanding autonomy and decentralization within the
Ottoman Empire, was a minority movement among the Arab high class of landowners and urban
notables, that challenged the dominant Ottomanist ideology. Arab nationalism can be specified as a
form of Arabism that included political demands for separation from the empire, as well as the
creation  of  an  Arab  state,  where  cultural  borders  corresponded  with  the  cultural  ones.  Arab
nationalism was a minority movement among the Arabists and hence a movement that had very
little traction.
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The repressive Turkish governmental policy of the CUP in the years 1908-1914 influenced
the increase of Arabism. However, to what extent it was the CUP’s Turkification that caused the
Arabist reaction is unclear, as most scholars do not agree, even on the fact of whether there was any
significant Turkification in this period in comparison to the era of Abdulhamid II. It is more likely
that Arabism was a reaction to the centralization of the CUP, which stripped many Arabs, who were
used to hold government posts under Abdulhamid II, from power. 
Based on the theories of nationalism, the nation building process in general, is defined by its
objective and subjective features. The objective components, which were used to define the modern
Arab nation can be seen in the following features: Firstly,  in the Arabic language and the Arab
history in the sense of the past glory that was recalled in the period of the Arab literary renaissance.
Secondly, in Islam that was revived by Islamic modernism. According to the modernist theories of
nationalism, the creation of modern nations is a result of certain subjective features such as social,
economical and cultural changes in  the society.  Among these characteristics,  it  was possible to
identify Gellner’s social aspects of modernity, which according to him are a precondition to the
emergence of nationalism.  The loss of the social  bond of  pre-modern society is  evident  in  the
weakening of Islam’s  position as the political and social bond. The emergence of the educated
middle  class,  versed  with  the  needs  of  the  modern  world,  codified  language  and  context-free
communication, is found in the generation of governmental clerks, journalists, teachers and military
officers produced by the Ottoman reformation. Based on this, Gellner’s theory proved applicable to
the Arab world.  Another  subjective feature of the Arab nation building process is  a conflict  of
interests. This was identified in the intra-elite power struggle of Damascene notables, where the
families that held governmental posts were Ottomanist and the families that did not switched to the
ideology of Arabism. It was only after the end of WWI, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, that
the Ottomanists were left with no other alternative than to adopt the ideology of Arab nationalism. 
In accordance with Miroslav Hroch’s periodization, the Arab nation building process went
through its phase A during the period of Arab literary renaissance. Phase B of the movement, which
is the period of agitation, manifested itself during the years 1908-1914 by the opposition to the
CUP. In this period, the Arab national movement did not succeed in mobilizing the population and
becoming a mass movement. The theoretical phase C of a national movement is characterized by a
mobilization of the crowds and the struggle for independence. Because the end of the war caused
the  dissolution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  brought  Arab  independence,  the  Arab  national
movement basically jumped from phase B to an independence, and ultimately skipped phase C.
According to Gellner’s definition of nationalism, it can be concluded that the Arab nation
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building process did not materialize into a nationalist movement until 1914. However, in this period
the necessary predispositions have crystallized in the Arab society, which allowed the movement to
become a mass ideology in the years to come. This ideology established a strong bond between the
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